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Introduction 
Defendant Abisai Martinez-Castellanos has raised three issues on appeal. 
The first issue involves counsel's failure to object when the district court engaged 
in jury voir dire proceedings in Martinez-Castellanos' s absence, and the second 
and third issues relate to a traffic stop. Martinez-Castellanos has relied on the 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine for the issues, as counsel's conduct fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and was prejudicial. 
The State makes several arguments in response. For the first issue, the 
State asserts that Martinez-Castellanos is challenging counsel's decisions about 
individual jurors, and that Martinez-Castellanos must comply with State v. King, 
2008 UT 54, 190 P.3d 1283, and State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92. But 
Martinez-Castellanos has challenged counsel's failure to object to his absence 
during a critical stage of trial, and King and Litherland do not address that issue. 
The State also asserts that case law is unsettled as to whether defendant is 
entitled to be present for voir dire, but the State misstates the law. Utah law 
supports Martinez-Castellanos's presence. Moreover, the State argues that 
Martinez-Castellanos has applied an incorrect prejudice analysis and it relies on 
speculative facts. But Martinez-Castellanos has relied on stipulated evidence and 
has applied the proper prejudice analysis under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984). Because counsel failed to object to Martinez-Castellanos's absence in 
jury selection, this court may remand the case for a new trial. 
1 
The second and third issues involve Trooper Sheets' extended traffic stop 
and Martinez-Castellanos' s right to counsel in a post-trial hearing to challenge 
Sheets' actions. Martinez-Castellanos has combined his response to the State's 
arguments. In short, because Martinez-Castellanos was not represented by 
counsel in post-trial proceedings, the court did not address the extended traffic 
stop. Instead, the State makes its own factual assessment about the extended 
stop, thereby usurping the function of the district court. Because the district court 
should assess the evidence and make findings, this court should remand the case 
to that court for further proceedings on the extended traffic-stop issue. 
Argument 
1. Martinez-Castellanos had the right to be present at jury voir dire 
Counsel was ineffective at trial when he failed to object to Martinez-
Castellanos' s absence during a critical stage of the trial, i.e., jury voir dire. (Op.Br. 
14-37.) While the State acknowledges that Martinez-Castellanos was absent, it 
urges this court to affirm the judgment. Specifically, the State maintains that the 
supreme court's analysis in State v. Litherland applies to determine if counsel 
acted below an objective standard of reasonableness; it asserts that" controlling 
law" did not entitle Martinez-Castellanos to be present for jury voir dire; it 
argues that the record supports a presumption that Martinez-Castellanos waived 
his right to be present; and it maintains that Martinez-Castellanos relied on an 
incorrect prejudice analysis. (Resp.Br. 15-48.) 
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The State's arguments are misguided for several reasons. 
First, Litherland does not govern the reasonableness question here, as the 
court in Litherland did not address the defendant's right to be present for voir 
dire. Second, Utah courts have recognized a defendant's right to be present at 
trial, including the right to be present during voir dire when prospective jurors 
are asked about experiences and biases. Third, the record shows that Martinez-
Castellanos did not waive his right to be present during voir dire and counsel 
failed to involve him for no discernible or strategic reason. And fourth, because 
the issue focuses on Martinez-Castellanos' s right to be present, he has applied 
the correct prejudice analysis and has demonstrated prejudice here. 
Martinez-Castellanos has addressed each point below. 
1.1 Litherland does not govern the reasonableness question here, as 
the court in Litherland did not address the defendant's right to be 
present for voir dire 
In addressing whether counsel's acts were objectively unreasonable, the 
State relies on Litherland. (Resp.Br. 18-20,31-44.) Under Litherland, the court ruled 
\;@ that trial counsel is entitled to a presumption that her decision not to remove a 
juror from the panel is strategic; and if a defendant challenges counsel's decision 
under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine, defendant must rebut the 
presumption. 2000 UT 76, iliJ20-25. 
Notably, the court in Litherland did not address a defendant's right to be 
present for a critical stage of the trial. Id. Likewise, Utah courts have not required 
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an appellant to apply the Litherland analysis to a claim that counsel failed to 
object to defendant's absence in voir dire.1 State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 48 P.3d 
953; State v. Glenny, 656 P.2d 990 (Utah 1982); State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d 1052 (Utah 
1935); State v. Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, 196 P.3d 124; State v. Zamora, 2005 UT 
App 196U, 2005 WL 977585 (citing Litherland for a different purpose). Instead, 
courts consider whether the defendant had a right to be present for the 
proceedings and also the circumstances around counsel's failure to protect that 
right. See Comm. v. Williams, 9 A.3d 613, 617-18 (Pa. 2010). 
In this case, counsel failed to object when the court conducted jury vofr 
dire outside Martinez-Castellanos's presence. (Resp.Br. 16.) Moreover, the 
supreme court has ruled that a defendant has the right to be present at all stages 
of trial. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if33; see also Utah Code§ 77-1-6(1)(a); Utah R. Crim. 
P. 17(a); Utah Const. art. I, § 12; State v. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 989-90 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). The supreme court has noted that jury selection is an important stage 
that "arguably has a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of a 
defendant's opportunity to defend against a charge," and also, "a defendant's 
right to a fair and just hearing could be thwarted by his or her absence." Hubbard, 
2002 UT 45, ~33 n.7. Because the issue on appeal focuses on counsel's failure to 
1 Martinez-Castellanos has discussed the impaneled jurors under the Litherland 
standard in his opening brief to demonstrate that reluctant and biased jurors 
were seated, and to show that jurors revealed information in voir dire that would 
have been important to him and his case. (Op.Br. 26-33.) 
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object when the district court conducted in-chambers voir dire in Martinez-
Castellanos's absence, this court should assess whether the defendant had a right 
to be present for those proceedings. According to the law, he did. Moreover, 
counsel's failure to object was objectively unreasonable. 
1.2 Controlling law supports a defendant's right to be present at trial, 
including the right to be present during voir dire when 
prospective jurors are asked about experiences and biases 
According to the State, controlling law does not support that Martinez-
Castellanos had a right to be present during in-chambers jury voir dire. (Resp.Br. 
44-45.) The State's argument is mistaken for several reasons. 
First, the State asserts that Hopt v. Utah Territory, 110 U.S. 574 (1884), is 
dictum and does not support a defendant's right to be present during jury voir 
dire. In support of that assertion, the State cites Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97 (1934). (Resp.Br. 46.) The State's analysis is overstated. 
The Hopt Court relied on Utah law and constitutional law to rule that a 
defendant is entitled to be present during jury voir dire. 110 U.S. at 578-79. The 
\@ holding in Hopt did not support that defendant may waive that right. The United 
States Supreme Court has since ruled that "[t]he broad dicta in Hopt ... that a 
trial can never continue in the defendant's absence have been expressly rejected." 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,342 (1970) (emphasis added); Snyder, 291 U.S. at 118 
n.2. That is, the Court has clarified that a defendant may waive the right to be 
present by consent or misconduct, and once the right is waived, the district court 
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may continue with the trial in the defendant's absence.2 Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106. 
Notably, the Court in Snyder did not overrule the defendant's right to be 
present during voir dire proceedings. It ruled that a defendant is entitled to be 
present "whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the 
fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." 291 U.S. at 105-06. And 
it reaffirmed the defendant's presence "at the examination of jurors," for it will 
be within the defendant's power "to give advice or suggestion or even to 
supersede his lawyers altogether and conduct the trial himself." Id. In Snyder, the 
Court considered whether jurors could view the scene in defendant's absence. Id. 
at 108. It recognized that such a practice was embedded in centuries' old case 
law. Id. at 111-12. Also, because defendant would not be allowed to ask or 
answer questions at the view, and because the prosecution summarized the 
proceedings and the "defendant and his counsel gave assent by acquiescence," 
the Court ruled defendant was not entitled to attend the view. Id. at 118. 
Second, Snyder does not diminish the right to be present for purposes of 
this case, nor does it diminish the relevance of Hopt. When Hopt was decided in 
1884, Utah law entitled a defendant to be "personally present at the trial." 110 
U.S. at 576 (quoting early version of the Utah Criminal Code). That law was 
relevant to the Court's holding. Id. Utah law in effect today is the same: a 
2 The right may be waived if the defendant consents, but only if the consent is 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 989-90; see also State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110-11 (Utah 1996). 
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defendant has the right to be "personally present at the trial." Utah R. Crim. P. 17 
(a); see Utah Code§ 77-1-6(1)(a) (defendant is entitled to "appear in person"); 
Utah Const. art. I, sec. 12 ("the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel"); State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 678 (Utah 1986) (" A 
defendant charged with a crime is entitled to be present at all stages of trial"). 
The State makes no reference to those authorities. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently ruled that when a phrase is transplanted 
from another legal source, the phrase brings with it the "old soil." Barneck v. 
UDOT, 2015 UT 50, 116, -- P.3d --. For purposes of this case, the phrase 
"personally present at the trial" carries with it the right under Utah law to be 
present at the voir dire proceedings. Hopt, 110 U.S. at 576. The United States 
Supreme Court's interpretation of that phrase in 1884 and Utah's use of the 
phrase since that time in legislation, rules, and the constitution is unmistakable: 
the Utah provisions exist against the backdrop of Hopt. 
Third, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the defendant's 
right to be present at critical stages of the trial and the defendant's right to be 
present during jury voir dire. 11 [C]onstitutionally and statutorily and case-wide 
defendant has a right to be present at all stages of the trial" and II any 
communication between judge and jury should be in the presence of the accused, 
his counsel and the prosecutor." State v. Lee, 585 P.2d 58, 58 (Utah 1978) 
(footnotes omitted). In State v. Aikers, the defendant was not present during voir 
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dire proceedings because he was not aware that the trial had started. 51 P.2d at 
1054-55. He arrived shortly before the court impaneled the jury and the court 
obtained his express and personal waiver on the record. Id. Defendant 
nevertheless challenged the validity of the proceedings on appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court relied on Utah law and ruled, "[t]here is no 
doubt but that the constitutional right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel is a sacred right of one accused of crime which may not be infringed or 
frittered away, and is one which may not be denied by a court or be waived by 
counsel." Id. at 1055. Utah statutory law and constitutional law guarantee the 
right. Id. If the court proceeds in the defendant's absence and without his express 
waiver, those circumstances qualify as ''ground[s] for reversal." Id. at 1056. 
Because Aikers expressly consented to the proceedings, which had been 
conducted outside his presence, the court affirmed his conviction. Id. at 1060. 
In State v. Glenny, the court reiterated that "U]ury selection has been 
determined to be a part of the trial" and a defendant has the right to be present. 
656 P.2d at 992 (citing State v. Carver, 496 P.2d 676,679 (Idaho 1972) (it is a matter 
of "settled law" that defendant is entitled to be present for jury selection, 
including voir dire)). The rationale stems from the defendant's right to an 
impartial jury and his right to be present in order to assist with his own defense. 
Carver, 496 P.2d at 679. If defendant is present for voir dire, the defense may be 
"made easier" and it will be in defendant's power "to give advice or suggestion" 
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to counsel or "to supersede his lawyers" and represent himself. Snyder, 291 U.S. 
at 105-06. "We add that an important aspect of any trial is its openness and 
fairness. The purpose of having an accused present is to insure that he has 
firsthand knowledge of the actions taken which lead to the eventual outcome of 
the trial and particularly that he knows how the jurors who decide the facts were 
selected." Carver, 496 P.2d at 679. "Impartiality and objectivity would be aided by 
the defendant's presence." Id. 
Fourth, the State asserts that contrary to the above authorities, the 
defendant's right to be present during jury voir dire "has not been recognized in 
Utah." (Resp.Br. 45.) In support of that assertion, the State cites State v. Zamora 
and State v. Hodge. Both Zamora and Hodge are distinguishable. In Hodge, this 
court ruled that defendant failed to adequately brief whether he was entitled to 
be present during in-chambers voir dire: "Defendant cites no authority for his 
claim that it was error not to have [him] present in chambers." 2008 UT App 409, 
119, 196 P.3d 124 (none of the individuals questioned served on the jury). 
In Zamora, this court cited Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, if 33, and ruled that the 
right to be present during in-chambers voir dire proceedings "has not been 
expressly recognized in Utah." Zamora, 2005 UT App U196, at *1. It also ruled 
that defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice under the ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel doctrine because he made no argument about impaneled jurors. Id. at 
*1-2. Notably, the Zamora court did not fully acknowledge the supreme court's 
9 
holding in Hubbard that jury voir dire "arguably has a reasonably substantial 
relation to the fullness of a defendant's opportunity to defend against a charge," 
and more importantly, "a defendant's right to a fair and just hearing could be 
thwarted by his or her absence" in voir dire proceedings. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45, 
,I33 n.7.3 But even if the Zamora court had acknowledged the defendant's 
substantial interest in participating in voir dire, the result in that case would be 
the same because of the lack of prejudice. Thus, the case is inapplicable here. 
Fifth, even if the State were correct and case law failed to recognize the 
right of the defendant to be present during voir dire, counsel was unreasonable 
when he failed to object here. In State v. Ison, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that 
defense counsel could not be excused for failing to make a motion under the 
hearsay rules to protect his client's interests even though the issue was II an open 
question in our courts." 2006 UT 26, 132, 135 P.3d 864. According to the court, 
once counsel became aware of the evidence, he should have II scour[ ed] the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule in search of a means to place the findings in the 
hands of the jury." Id. Counsel's failure to do so was unreasonable. Id. 
In this case, counsel had every reason to object to voir dire proceedings in 
Martinez-Castellanos' s absence: authority dating more than 100 years supports 
3 Zamora may not qualify as controlling authority. As the supreme court held, if a 
case does not provide analysis or recognize authority for the issue, it has little 
persuasive effect and is not dispositive of the matter. Horton v. Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 1989). 
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the defendant's right to participate in voir dire; the court and legislature have 
enacted rules mirroring the language in Hopf; and several jurisdictions have 
recognized policy reasons supporting the right. But counsel failed to object, and 
no reason, other than ignorance or indifference, supports his conduct. 
1.3 The record shows that Martinez-Castellanos did not waive his 
right to be present during voir dire and counsel failed to involve 
Martinez-Castellanos for no discernible or strategic reason 
According to the State, the record supports the presumption that Martinez-
Castellanos waived the right to be present during voir dire because he did not 
affirmatively assert his right to be present; and alternatively, the record must be 
construed in favor of the presumption that counsel specifically involved 
Martinez-Castellanos in voir dire or counsel did not involve him for strategic 
reasons. (Resp.Br. 12,33-35,47.) The State has relied on contradictory and 
speculative arguments rather than the evidence; and it has misstated the law. 
First, the State cites Hubbard and argues that Martinez-Castellanos waived 
the right to be present during in-chambers voir dire because he did not 
~ specifically assert the right. (Resp.Br. 33-34.) In Hubbard, the district court 
examined veniremen at the bench in defendant's presence but out of earshot. 
2002 UT 45, 1131-34. There is no indication that the trial court impaneled the 
veniremen for trial and no indication that counsel failed to involve the defendant 
in the process. Id. Indeed, the defendant in Hubbard was well aware of the 
proceedings and had no complaints about counsel. Id. 
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While the State suggests that Martinez-Castellanos was required under 
Hubbard to speak up when the judge and counsel conducted voir dire in his 
absence, the record supports that unlike the defendant in Hubbard, Martinez-
Castellanos was not aware of the proceedings. 4 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the district court did not state in open 
court that "it would question individual prospective jurors in chambers," let 
alone examine them about biases or prejudices. (Resp.Br. 34 (citing R.440:21).) It 
announced that it would take a brief recess for a few minutes to "meet with 
counsel" in chambers to determine II any additional questions that they'd like to 
ask." (R.440:21.) The court stated, "we may be calling you" and II ask[ing] 
questions of you," but it did not specify that prospective jurors would be invited 
back in chambers for the process. The court then directed the attorneys "to join 
me" in chambers, which they did without any break in the proceedings. (Id.) 
Thus, Martinez-Castellanos had no opportunity to understand that the court and 
counsel intended to proceed with jury voir dire in his absence. See Anderson, 929 
P.2d at 1110 (a waiver must be voluntary and involve an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right; defendant must be free to attend). 
Second, while the State urges this court to presume that Martinez-
4 Moreover, Martinez-Castellanos had the right to rely on counsel to make the 
objection and to involve him in the proceedings. State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 
359 (Utah 1994). Because counsel failed to do so, Martinez-Castellanos has 
asserted the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
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Castellanos voluntarily waived his right to be present, the law does not support 
such a presumption. Specifically, courts have eschewed a presumption in favor 
of waiver if the waiver involves the defendant's right to be present at trial. Houtz, 
714 P.2d at 678 ("voluntariness may not be presumed"); Larson v. Tansy, 911 F.2d 
392, 396 (10th Cir. 1990) (indulging II every reasonable presumption against 
waiver" where defendant was not present during portions of the trial). 
Third, the record fails to support that Martinez-Castellanos waived the 
right to be present and it fails to support that counsel involved him in the 
proceedings. In fact, the affirmative evidence is to the contrary. It supports that 
counsel did not discuss jury selection with Martinez-Castellanos or involve him. 
(R.428.) Counsel's conduct is inexplicable given that Martinez-Castellanos was 
competent to stand trial and competent to assist in the process. Indeed, there is 
no conceivable tactical reason for counsel's failure to involve Martinez-
Castellanos or even to obtain a waiver. Because of counsel's ignorance or 
indifference, Martinez-Castellanos had no opportunity to understand the voir . 
dire proceedings or his right to participate. 
Fourth, the State faults Martinez-Castellanos for not includmg his own 
declaration of the in-chambers proceedings. (Resp.Br. 12,34.) That criticism is 
unfounded particularly where all parties involved in the proceedings have 
stipulated to the supplemental record and the record shows that the court did 
not include Martinez-Castellanos and counsel did not involve him. 
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(R.440:21;428.) Because Martinez-Castellanos did not have the opportunity to 
participate, his declaration would be limited and duplicative of non-speculative 
evidence already in the record. (Id. )5 
Fifth, the State suggests that counsel did not advise Martinez-Castellanos 
to attend the in-chambers proceedings "because the jurors would likely be more 
candid if he were not there." (Resp.Br. 35.)6 But nothing suggests that prospective 
jurors-or specifically, Jurors Mangelson, Sacra, and Jones-would have 
withheld information. Because venire members had taken an oath before 
answering voir dire questions, there is no basis for assuming they would 
withhold information; and Utah courts should be unwillmg to make such an 
assumption. State v. White, 577 P.2d 552,555 (Utah 1978); (R.440:5-6 (prospective 
jurors took an oath to answer truthfully)). 
But even if counsel believed that prospective jurors would violate the oath 
5 As the court in Larson held, the defendant was capable of assisting in his 
defense; and if he had been allowed to participate, he would have had the 
opportunity to assist counsel in voir dire. 911 F.2d at 395-96. Nothing more is 
required to support error. Id.; Aikers, 51 P.2d at 1056; (Op.Br. 33-37). 
6 Although the State cites State v. Alexander and United States v. Bertoli, those cases 
are inapposite. (Resp.Br. 35-36.) In Alexander, the court had concerns about two 
jurors and examined them in chambers in the middle of trial. 833 N.W.2d 126, 
135 (Wis. 2013). During the process, counsel consulted defendant for input. Id. 
And in Bertoli, the court exam.med jurors during trial about premature 
deliberations. 40 F.3d 1384, 1397 (3d Cir. 1994). In that case, the defendant's 
presence would not have contributed to the matter. Id.; United States v. Gagnon, 
470 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1985) ( defendants could have done nothing had they been 
involved in the conference and they would have gained nothing); see also United 
States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 997-98 (3d Cir. 1980) (a defendant has no right 
to be present when a juror is dismissed). 
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in Martinez-Castellanos's presence, counsel should have taken steps to otherwise 
involve Martinez-Castellanos in the process, to inform Martinez-Castellanos of 
the process and obtain a valid waiver, or to alert the court to Martinez-
Castellanos's rights. In short, the State has not explained its speculative 
assertions and how counsel's failure to involve Martinez-Castellanos in the 
process and failure to object to Martinez-Castellanos' s absence may qualify as 
sound strategy. Instead, the State offers excuses that could have been addressed 
at trial if counsel had taken action to support Martinez-Castellanos's rights. 
In this case, Martinez-Castellanos had no opportunity to understand that 
in-chambers voir dire implicated a critical stage of the proceedings and his right 
to participate. Moreover, Martinez-Castellanos had no opportunity to learn that 
Mangelson had served 40 years with the highway patrol in drug interdiction; 
and no opportunity-either on his own or with the assistance of counsel-to 
observe Sacra and Jones and to gauge their demeanor when they revealed biases 
and reservations. "'Since [defendant] was excluded from the in-chambers voir 
~ dire, he never heard those prospective jurors['] responses. In particular, he did 
not have the opportunity to hear [ a prospective juror] explain her biases [ about 
cases involving a similar fact pattern]. This prevented defendant from knowing 
about her prejudices and from insisting that defense counsel strike her with a 
peremptory challenge." State v. Bird, 43 P.3d 266 (Mont. 2002). 
The evidence supports that because counsel was deficient in his 
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performance, Martinez-Castellanos was not allowed to participate in jury 
selection in violation of the law. 
1.4 Martinez-Castellanos has applied the correct prejudice analysis 
and has shown prejudice 
The State has not addressed whether Martinez-Castellanos was prejudiced 
when counsel failed to object to his absence during voir dire. Instead, it relies on 
State v. King, 2008 UT 54, and asserts that under the prejudice analysis, Martinez-
Castellanos was required to demonstrate "actual bias" in the jury but has failed 
to do so here. (Resp.Br. 11,20-32.) Martinez-Castellanos responds to the State's 
prejudice analysis as follows: First, the State misstates the prejudice analysis in 
King, and it fails to address the traditional Strickland prejudice analysis, which is 
applicable when counsel fails to object to a defendant's absence at trial. Under 
the King analysis and under the traditional Strickland analysis, Martinez-
Castellanos has demonstrated prejudice. Second, the State makes unfounded 
assumptions in its analysis. And third, the State relies on an irrelevant and illegal 
charge to assert the jury was not biased here. 
1.4.1 The State misstates the prejudice analysis in King and 
fails to address the traditional Strickland prejudice 
analysis 
The State relies on King and asserts that for prejudice, Martinez-
Castellanos was required to show that counsel's deficient performance allowed 
the court to seat an" actually biased" jury. (Resp.Br. 21.) The State 
misunderstands King. 
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1.4.1.1 The King and Strickland standards 
The King prejudice analysis applies in limited circumstances. It applies if 
the defendant has asked the court to presume prejudice. In King two jurors 
indicated in voir dire that II they thought they would be fair and impartial despite 
an experience with abuse." 2008 UT 54, ,rs. Defense counsel failed to ask follow-
up questions and the court impaneled the jurors. Id. When the defendant raised 
the issue on appeal under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine, the 
supreme court ruled that a defendant is entitled to a presumpti.on of prejudice if the 
defendant asserts a claim of ineffective assistance because counsel failed to ask 
follow-up questions and a juror with actual bias was impaneled. 2008 UT 54, 
,r,r2,13,18-19. Because the jurors in King demonstrated only "the potential for 
bias," defendant was not entitled to the presumption of prejudice. Id. ,r,rl3,17.7 
The court also referenced the traditional Strickland prejudice analysis. Id. 
,I24. It stated, "we typically place on a defendant the obligation to demonstrate 
that the error prejudiced him." Id. ,r24 (citing cases for the harmless-error 
analysis). The supreme court affirmed the utility of the traditional analysis in a 
case involving "a potentially biased juror" but refused to II stretch[] the bounds" 
of presumptive prejudice to those circumstances. Id. ,r,r18,35 (stating the traditional 
7 The court in King ordered proceedings under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
23B to determine if jurors, who stated they were not biased, would nevertheless 
be biased. 2008 UT 54, ,r43. Those circumstances are not present here: Sacra took 
an oath to be truthful in voir dire and then acknowledged that she was biased. 
(R.440:5;415.) 
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analysis places the defendant at a disadvantage). Thus, contrary to the State's 
assertions, the court has not mandated proof of II actual bias" and it has not 
disavowed the traditional prejudice analysis in a case involving jurors. To the 
contrary, the court continues to recognize the traditional analysis and it requires 
proof of "actual bias" if the defendant intends to rely on the presumption of 
prejudice. 
Indeed, if counsel has failed to object to defendant's absence at trial, courts 
have applied the traditional Strickland analysis. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 
ifif 61-63, 299 P.3d 892 (stating defendant failed to show impartiality or "an 
otherwise unfair trial"); United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 498 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (although it was error to exclude the defendant from voir dire, the error 
was not prejudicial because "the question of guilt or innocence was not close"). 
1.4.1.2 Martinez-Castellanos has shown prejudice 
Martinez-Castellanos has demonstrated both actual bias in the jury (for 
presumptive prejudice), and prejudice under Strickland. (Op.Br. 33-37.)8 He has 
shown "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the ~ 
result of the proceedings would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 
(Op.Br. 33-37.). 
Because the State has failed to appreciate the holding in King and has 
8 Martinez-Castellanos has argued that the proceedings were "unreliable and 
hence unfair" and he has addressed the standard in the opening brief. (Op.Br. 34-
37); Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ifif 61-63 (defendant must show that the proceedings 
were unfair). 
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"largely ignore[ d]" the Strickland analysis applicable to counsel's failure to object 
to Martinez-Castellanos' s involuntary absence from voir dire proceedings, 
Martinez-Castellanos's argument on that point is uncontested. Under the 
circumstances, the State has failed to adequat~ly brief the matter and this court 
may accept Martinez-Castellanos' s arguments and reverse the judgment for a 
new trial. See Broderick v. Apartment Mgmt. Consultants, LLC, 2012 UT 17, ,r,r14,20, 
279 P.3d 391 (the adequate briefing standard applies to appellee, and if appellee 
ignores an argument, the court may accept appellant's claim). 
Alternatively, the State asserts that Martinez-Castellanos failed to 
demonstrate actual bias for presumptive prejudice. (Resp.Br. 20-32.) The State is 
incorrect. Martinez-Castellanos has demonstrated actual bias. Because he has, he 
is entitled to the presumption of prejudice. 
An actual bias is shown if a prospective juror makes an express admission 
in voir dire that is prejudicial to a party's interest. Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 
F.3d 511, 516-17 (10th Cir. 1998). It is "the existence of a state of mind that leads 
~ to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality." United States 
v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997). In Ross v. Oklahoma, a venireman initially 
declared that he could follow the law for sentencing, but then expressed bias 
when he declared that he would vote to impose the death penalty if the jury 
found the defendant guilty. 487 U.S. 81, 83-84, 85 (1988). Even though the 
venireman's subsequent statement was conditional, the Supreme Court ruled 
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that the statement would require his removal from the panel for cause. Id. 
In this case, Martinez-Castellanos has argued that "jurors with biases 
served on the jury," and" a biased juror's participation in the trial is prejudicial." 
(Op.Br. 34-35.) Sacra revealed a strong bias when she stated during voir dire that 
in her opinion, "if a person had drugs in the car, they were probably guilty." (Id.) 
The circumstances in this case are more egregious than the circumstances in Ross: 
Sacra expressed disregard for the presumption of innocence. She would consider 
a person guilty in the specific circumstances of the case even before she heard the 
evidence in a public courtroom where defendant would have the protection of 
the right of confrontation and cross-examination. 
The State asks this court to disregard Sacra' s statements in voir dire and 
under oath-as well as statements and disclosures from Mangelson and Jones-
and to assume impartiality because those individuals completed questionnaires 
earlier in the morning before the court called the case for trial. (Resp.Br. 17-18,24-
25.) But prospective jurors completed pre-trial questionnaires before they knew 
anything about the case and before they took an oath to be truthful. (R.440:5-9.) 
Sacra intimated in her questionnaire that she had "strong feelings" and beliefs 
but she, Jones, and Mangelson did not disclose their biases and experiences. 
(R.461: Questionaires 2,3,13.) They disclosed pertinent information only after 
taking the oath, supporting the determination that they felt the weight of the 
oath. Thus, the State's reliance on the questionnaires is improper. Moreover, the 
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Supreme Court in Ross did not give more weight to the prospective juror's initial 
statements in light of subsequent statements revealing bias. 487 U.S. at 83-84, 85. 
The State also argues that because no one removed Sacra or Jones from the 
panel, the court should presume that each provided appropriate answers of 
impartiality in voir dire. (Resp.Br. 25-26.) But such a presumption would 
undermine the record, which supports that counsel failed to acknowledge Sacra's 
statement of bias and he did nothing in the face of Jones's reluctance. (R.428-30.) 
The record also supports that Martinez-Castellanos was competent and able to 
assist in jury selection but counsel failed to involve him. If counsel had involved 
him, he would have been able to bring to counsel's attention Sacra's bias and 
Jones's reluctance, and under those circumstances, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that counsel would have investigated them or removed them from the 
jury. But Martinez-Castellanos had no opportunity to participate and was not 
allowed to assist in jury selection or to learn about juror biases and predilections. 
Because Martinez-Castellanos has demonstrated actual bias, he is entitled 
~ to the presumption of prejudice. Alternatively, this court may rely on Martinez-
Castellanos's prejudice arguments set forth in the opening brief. (Op.Br. 33-37.) 
1.4.2 The State assumes "follow up questions" where there 
were none 
The State assumes that because the prosecution and defense asked follow-
up questions of two or three venire members, they must have asked follow-up 
questions when Sacra expressed bias and when Jones expressed reluctance about 
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her ability to function as a juror.9 (Resp.Br. 27-29.) But the fact that counsel asked 
follow-up questions of others demonstrates he did not ask the same of Sacra and 
Jones. Even more importantly, the State's argument acknowledges that follow-up 
questions were necessary to assess whether Sacra and Jones were biased and 
reluctant, or whether their voir dire statements were the product of light 
impression. Absent the follow-up questions, the record supports bias and 
reluctance, and under Utah law, Sacra and Jones should have been removed. 
State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, 127, 24 P.3d 948 (if a prospective juror expresses 
partiality, the challenged juror must be excused or investigated). 
The State subsequently assumes that counsel did not ask follow-up 
questions of Jones because he was not concerned that she expressed reluctance in 
the face of questions about her ability to be fair, and he was not concerned that 
the court placed pressure on her. (Resp.Br. 38-39.) The State goes so far as to 
suggest that a reasonable attorney would not have removed Jones or asked 
follow-up questions; and it speculates that Jones's reluctance stemmed from her 
age or employment. But reasonable counsel should know the law. See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 688 ( counsel must bring skill and know ledge to the process to render 
it reliable). And under the law, the circumstances fail to support Jones's ability to 
9 The State has cited several cases that support the need for follow-up questions 
to assess whether statements of bias are the product of light impression. 
(Resp.Br. 27-28.) Those cases are not applicable here because the record shows 
that no one asked follow-up questions of Sacra and Jones. 
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function as a juror. Wach, 2001 UT 35, if34 (the court's question, asked twice, is 
not sufficient to rebut inference of bias). 
Counsel was required to "consult with the defendant on important 
decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the 
course of the prosecution." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Had he done so, Martinez-
Castellanos would have been able to bring concerns about jurors to counsel's 
attention. As it is, Sacra and Jones disclosed bias and reluctance, and counsel did 
not follow up with them in voir dire. 
1.4.3 The fact that the jury acquitted on the weapons charge is 
irrelevant to the analysis 
According to the State, the "split verdict" shows that no juror was biased. 
(Resp.Br. 30.) But the split verdict shows that Sacra relied on her bias: she 
believed a person was probably guilty if he had drugs in the car. 
The jury was required to determine whether Martinez-Castellanos 
possessed the drugs and paraphernalia, but it did not have to make that 
determination for the items charged as weapons because Martinez-Castellanos 
acknowledged he owned those items. (R.425-26.) Thus, while Sacra relied on her 
bias to find Martinez-Castellanos guilty of possessing drugs and para phemalia, 
she had to rely on other factors to assess items for the weapons charge. 
Specifically, the central issue for the jury as it related to the knife and box 
cutter was whether those items even qualified as weapons. (R.440:39-40;109-
10;143-46;167.) The supreme court has answered that question against the 
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prosecution. Salt Lake City v. Miles, 2014 UT 47, ifif22-23,25-28, 342 P.3d 212. 
In this case, the jury split on the verdict because the State's weapons 
charge was untenable under Utah law. The split verdict has no bearing on the 
prejudice analysis. Martinez-Castellanos respectfully asks this court to reverse 
the case and remand for a new trial. 
2. The State improperly assumes findings for the extended traffic-stop 
issue, thereby usurping the function of the district court 
Martinez-Castellanos was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel 
when counsel failed to file a proper motion to suppress evidence seized during 
an unlawfully extended traffic stop, and particularly when the district court 
brought the matter to defense counsel's attention and requested briefing on the 
issue in post-trial proceedings. (Op. Br. 38-55.) The State disagrees and makes 
assumptions about how the district court would have resolved the matter if 
counsel had properly addressed the issue in the district court. Because Martinez-
Castellanos's second and third issues on appeal involve the traffic stop and his 
right to counsel in connection with proceedings where the court expressed 
concern about the stop, Martinez-Castellanos has responded to the State's 
arguments for the second and third issues together here. 
First, the reasonable suspicion analysis is fact intensive, and this court 
leaves resolution of facts susceptible to alternative interpretations to the district 
court. See State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,450 (Utah 1996) (reasonable suspicion is 
highly fact dependent and facts are variable). In this case, Trooper Sheets 
24 
testified that Martinez-Castellanos's mannerisms motivated him to extend the 
traffic stop, but he made different statements in pre-trial proceedings and at trial 
about Martinez-Castellanos's mannerisms and the circumstances. Sheets 
subsequently admitted that the mannerisms he described may have been 
Martinez-Castellanos's "normal way"'; and the dash-cam video supports normal 
behavior. (Op.Br. 40-42.)10 Martinez-Castellanos has asked this court to remand 
the case so that the district court may address the extended traffic stop. But the 
State seems to urge this court to make its own interpretations of the evidence. 
(Resp.Br. 52-62.) That is inappropriate. The district court is in the best position to 
assess whether the trooper's testimony is conflicting, is unsupported by objective 
information, or lacks credibility. Remand will ensure Martinez-Castellanos the 
right to counsel in post-trial proceedings involving the traffic stop, and counsel 
will have the opportunity to scrutinize the evidence and cross-examine Trooper 
Sheets about the changes in his versions of the events, the differences in his 
testimony, and the dash-cam video. 
Second, Martinez-Castellanos challenges Trooper Sheets' reliance on a 
three-year-old criminal history as insufficient to support ongoing conduct for 
reasonable suspicion. (Op.Br. 42-45.) In response, the State asserts the history was 
10 The State asserts that the district court may not take into consideration Sheets' 
trial testimony or the dash-cam video "in litigating the pre-trial suppression 
motion." (Resp.Br. 49,55.) The State is mistaken. The district court can take the 
trial evidence into consideration specifically because it expressed concern with 
the extended traffic stop in post-trial proceedings. (R.268;422.) 
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relevant even though it dated back years because it showed recurrence. (Resp.Br. 
53,58-60.) The State's argument suggests that a person with a criminal history 
loses some rights under the fourth amendment, but that is incorrect. Even a 
person with a criminal history must be allowed to live without risk of constant 
harassment from officers. United States v. Pierre, 484 F.3d 75, 84 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(officer knew defendant's license had been suspended on an ongoing basis). The 
district court should be allowed to assess the criminal history and its relevance 
under the totality of the circumstances. 
Third, the State refuses to credit as relevant Martinez-Castellanos's normal 
behavior as seen in the dash-cam video. (Resp.Br. 60-61.) The video shows that 
Martinez-Castellanos is polite, honest, and cooperative. Contrary to the State's 
assertion, it is relevant under the totality of the circumstances and the district 
court should be allowed to assess it. If the district court agrees with Martinez-
Castellanos about his mannerisms, the prior criminal history "standing alone" 
may be insufficient to support reasonable suspicion for the extended stop. United 
States v. Powell, 666 F.3d 180, 188 (4th Cir. 2011). 
Fourth, the State asserts that because Martinez-Castellanos has raised his 
traffic-stop issue in the context of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine, 
he must show that his claim has merit. (Resp.Br. 49,62.) Martinez-Castellanos has 
shown his claim has merit, the district court recognized it has merit (R.268,422), 
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and this court may remand the case under the unique circumstances here to 
allow Martinez-Castellanos to address the traffic-stop issue. 
Fifth, the State argues that the court fulfilled its duty when it appointed 
conflict counsel to represent Martinez-Castellanos in post-trial proceedings to 
address the circumstances around the extended traffic stop. (Resp.Br. 64.) The 
State also acknowledges that appointed counsel viewed his role only as "a friend 
of the court." (Resp.Br. 65.) The fact that counsel did not view his role as counsel 
for Martinez-Castellanos is plain and obvious from the record. Likewise, the law 
is plain on this point: "To be effective, an attorney must play the role of an active 
advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 
435 (Utah 1996) (citing Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,394 (1985)). Because Martinez-
Castellanos was denied the representation of counsel, no one addressed the issue 
that was most troubling to the district court: the trooper's reasons for extending 
the traffic stop. Based on the unique circumstances of this case and given the 
district court's concerns with the extended traffic stop, this court should remand 
V.P the case for further proceedings, and for the appoinhnent of new counsel to 
represent Martinez-Castellanos in those proceedings. 
Conclusion 
Martinez-Castellanos respectfully requests that this court reverse the 
conviction and remand the case for a new trial or for further proceedings; and 
remand the case to correct the sentence. 
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